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__________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
and Energy (NJDEPE) appeals the denial of its application to 
enjoin shipment of partially irradiated reactor fuel by barge 
through New Jersey coastal waters.  NJDEPE claims the shipment 
violates the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321-4347 (1988), because neither the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) nor the United States Coast Guard conducted an 
environmental assessment of the method and route of 
transportation.  NJDEPE also claims certain licenses were 
improperly granted to the Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) 
and the Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) by the NRC and the 
Coast Guard in violation of the Coastal Zone Management Act 
(CZMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992), because 
neither PECo nor LIPA demonstrated its actions would be 
consistent with state coastal management laws.  
 We hold the district court properly dismissed NJDEPE's 
NEPA claim against the NRC for want of jurisdiction, and properly 
granted summary judgment on NJDEPE's CZMA claim in favor of the 
Coast Guard.  We also rule on three claims the district court did 
not address.  We will instruct the district court to grant 
summary judgment for the Coast Guard on NJDEPE's NEPA claim 
against it, dismiss the CZMA claim against the NRC for want of 
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jurisdiction, and dismiss the CZMA claim against LIPA and PECo 
for failure to state a claim. 
I. 
 A.  Events leading to fuel shipment 
 The Shoreham Nuclear Power Station in Wading River, New 
York was licensed by the NRC in 1989 for full power operation but 
was never put into commercial operation.  LIPA, a corporate 
municipal instrumentality and political subdivision of New York 
State, bought Shoreham from the original owner, the Long Island 
Lighting Company, and in 1992 began the process of 
decommissioning the plant by dismantling and removing or 
decontaminating its various components. 
 By February, 1993, the only remaining step in 
decommissioning the plant was disposal of its fuel, 560 bundles 
of uranium-235, containing an estimated radioactivity of 176,000 
Curies.0  On March 1, 1993, LIPA entered into an agreement with 
PECo and General Electric Co., under which PECo would accept 
delivery of Shoreham's nuclear fuel and General Electric would 
manage the project.  PECo intended to use the almost new nuclear 
fuel in its Limerick Generating Plant near Pottstown, 
Pennsylvania.  Under the agreement, LIPA was responsible for 
transporting the fuel. 
                     
0Uranium becomes irradiated as it is used for fuel.  Because the 
Shoreham fuel was only used for two days of testing, its level of 
radioactivity is relatively low.  LIPA states that 176,000 Curies 
is one-one hundredth of the radioactivity of fully irradiated 
fuel. 
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 On March 8, 1993, PECo applied to the NRC for an 
amendment to its operating license to allow it to receive the 
fuel.  On March 31, the NRC published a notice of a proposed 
finding that the license amendment involved no significant 
environmental hazards under NEPA, 58 Fed. Reg. 16851, 16867-68 
(1993), and that transport would be by rail.  Id. at 16867.  On 
May 18, pursuant to its regulations, the NRC published an 
Environmental Assessment of the proposed license amendment, along 
with a "Finding of No Significant Impact" (FONSI), which 
indicated that no Environmental Impact Statement was required. 58 
Fed. Reg. 29010-11 (1993); see 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.21, 51.250; 42 
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).  The FONSI did not discuss the method 
or route of transportation of the fuel, but included a finding 
that the impact from transporting the nuclear fuel would be 
minimal, based on application of Table S-4, 10 C.F.R. § 51.52. 
The NRC issued the amendment June 23, 1993. 
 The parties disagree about when NJDEPE learned of 
LIPA's plans to ship by barge.  NJDEPE states that at about the 
time the amendment was issued, LIPA informed NJDEPE that it was 
considering shipping the fuel by barge along New Jersey's coast. 
LIPA and PECo claim they had discussed barge shipment with NJDEPE 
at a number of meetings in May and June.  In any event, NJDEPE 
asserts that in July it expressed objections to barge transport 
but after receiving no response from PECo or LIPA assumed that 
the barge shipment plan had been delayed or abandoned, until an 
                     
0All C.F.R. references are to the 1993 edition of the Code of 
Federal Regulations unless otherwise indicated. 
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Assistant Commissioner of NJDEPE read in a newspaper in mid-
August that LIPA and PECo still intended to pursue the plan. 
NJDEPE also acknowledges receipt on August 9 from LIPA of an 
application for a state permit, a "Certificate of Handling," that 
indicated the plan to transport the fuel by barge.0 
 On July 7, LIPA submitted a proposed "Operations Plan" 
to the Coast Guard's Captain of the Port of Long Island Sound 
describing the route, equipment, safety and emergency procedures 
of the barge shipment.0  In a July 27 letter, the Captain of the 
Port stated that final approval was contingent on structural 
inspections of the barges, and gave directions for reporting 
positions and emergencies en route.  NJDEPE states it did not see 
a copy of LIPA's plan until September 3. 
 LIPA planned shipment in specialized casks approved by 
the NRC for shipment of radioactive materials.  Each cask weighs 
130,000 pounds, and holds up to 17 fuel assemblies.  The casks' 
manufacturer, non-party Pacific Nuclear Systems, Inc., asked the 
NRC to approve modifications in the support structure and packing 
of the casks to fit the Shoreham fuel assemblies.  On May 11 and 
August 19, the NRC issued "Certificate[s] of Compliance for 
                     
0The Certificate of Handling, required by New Jersey regulation 
before transport of radioactive materials, 7 N.J.A.C. § 28-12, is 
a separate requirement from federal "Consistency Certification" 
under the CZMA.  Although LIPA was never granted the Certificate 
of Handling, NJDEPE stated at oral argument that LIPA had filed 
an action in federal district court that resulted in its being 
freed from the requirement. 
 
0Captains of the Port are Coast Guard officers charged with 
enforcing safety, security, and environmental regulations in 
their respective areas.  33 C.F.R. § 1.01-30(a).   
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Radioactive Materials Packages" to Pacific Nuclear Systems, 
approving the alterations.  The cask is designed to contain fully 
irradiated fuel, which would be more than 100 times as 
radioactive as the Shoreham fuel.0  
 On September 8, NJDEPE notified the Coast Guard by 
letter, with a copy to LIPA, that the CZMA, 16 U.S.C. 
§1456(c)(3)(A), required LIPA to submit a "Consistency 
Certification" showing compliance with state coastal management 
law.  On September 15, NJDEPE sent a similar letter to the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).0  On 
October 1, NOAA replied that no such submission was required. 
LIPA refused to refrain from shipping until it had submitted the 
requested certification. 
 Barge shipments commenced on September 24, 1993, with 
each barge carrying a single cask.  A total of 33 shipments was 
planned.  The barges left Long Island, travelled south through 
the Atlantic Ocean, at points within 15 miles of the New Jersey 
Coast, went around Cape May through New Jersey waters and up the 
                     
0The cask, called the "IF-300," is authorized to contain fuel 
that has experienced reactor burnup of 35,000 megawatt days per 
metric ton of uranium, while the Shoreham fuel has experienced 
reactor burnup of only 87 megawatt days per ton.  Similarly, each 
cask is authorized for fuel with a total decay heat of 11,720 
watts, while the fuel in each shipment will have a decay heat of 
only 34 watts. 
0The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (an 
administration under the Commerce Department) promulgates 
regulations implementing the consistency provisions of the CZMA. 
See 15 C.F.R. Part 930.  The Assistant Administrator for Coastal 
Zone Management of NOAA rules on requests such as NJDEPE's.  Id. 
§ 930.54. 
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Delaware River to dock at Eddystone, Pennsylvania.  The fuel was 
then moved by rail to PECo's Limerick plant. 
 B.  Litigation 
 On September 21, 1993, NJDEPE filed suit against the 
NRC, the Coast Guard, LIPA, and PECo, raising three counts. 
 Count I complained the NRC and the Coast Guard had 
violated NEPA by not preparing adequate "Environmental 
Assessments" when they approved the fuel shipment from LIPA to 
PECo because NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), and an NRC regulation, 
10 C.F.R. § 51.30, required assessment of the risks of and 
alternatives to the proposed method and route of transportation. 
Lacking this analysis, the Environmental Assessment of PECo's 
license amendment was "fatally flawed."  Verified Complaint at 
19, Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 24. 
 Count II claimed the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), and an NRC 
regulation, 10 C.F.R. § 70.3, required LIPA to obtain an 
amendment to its license for its nuclear fuel or to its 
Decommissioning Plan before shipping the fuel. 
 Count III referred to the CZMA's requirement that 
applicants for certain federal licenses whose activity would 
affect a state's coastal zone submit certifications of 
consistency with the state's approved Coastal Zone Management 
program.  16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A).  NJDEPE claimed that Coast 
Guard approval of LIPA's transport plan and NRC approval of 
PECo's license amendment and of LIPA's transfer plans constituted 
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such licenses, but lacked the required consistency 
certifications. 
 NJDEPE requested a temporary restraining order and a 
preliminary injunction against shipment until an adequate 
Environmental Assessment was done.  LIPA claimed delay in 
decommissioning would cost $2-3 million per month in carrying 
costs and additional expenses for disruption of contractors' 
schedules.  On September 22 the district court denied the motion 
for a temporary restraining order.  On September 24 we denied a 
motion for an injunction pending appeal, and the same day Circuit 
Justice Souter denied a motion to stay our order. 
 On October 12, 1993, the district court ruled on 
NJDEPE's claims.  Reading Count I as essentially a challenge to 
two final orders of the NRC -- the PECo license amendment and 
Pacific Nuclear System's Certificate of Compliance for its 
containers for radioactive materials -- the court dismissed the 
claim for want of jurisdiction, holding that under the Hobbs Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), the court of appeals has 
exclusive jurisdiction of challenges to final orders of the NRC. 
 Count II was withdrawn by consent of the parties. 
 With respect to Count III, the court observed that the 
CZMA required a consistency certification only from an applicant 
for "a required Federal license or permit."  16 U.S.C. 
§1456(c)(3)(A).  Citing a finding by the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration that LIPA's submission of its 
transport plan was not an application for a required federal 
license or permit, and that the Coast Guard had not in fact 
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issued a federal license or permit, the court found the CZMA 
requirements inapplicable. 
 NJDEPE appealed the orders on Counts I and III.0  We 
accelerated the appeal and on December 1 heard oral argument. 
Because the parties expressed an urgent need for a quick 
resolution we issued an oral opinion from the bench, noting that 
a written opinion would follow.  We held that all of NJDEPE's 
claims failed, and briefly set forth our reasons.  We now write 
to explain our holding.0 
II. 
 NJDEPE invoked the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
district court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (1988) (federal question), 
1361 (1988) (mandamus), 1337 (1988) (actions arising under acts 
of Congress regulating commerce), and 5 U.S.C. § 701-06 (1988) 
(Administrative Procedure Act).  We have jurisdiction of the 
district court's dismissal and grant of summary judgment under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). 
 We have plenary review over whether the district court 
had subject matter jurisdiction.  "`[W]e accept as true the facts 
alleged in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can 
                     
0NJDEPE states in its brief that it agreed to dismissal of Count 
II's Atomic Energy Act claims only with respect to LIPA, but not 
to other parties.  Because NJDEPE did not press any of those 
claims in its brief or oral argument, we regard Count II as 
properly dismissed and not before us on appeal. 
0In our oral opinion, we stated alternative grounds for several 
holdings.  Seeking to rule on grounds as narrow as possible, we 
have determined we need not reach some of the issues discussed in 
the oral opinion.  Particularly, we do not decide whether 
consistency review of the Coast Guard action would conform to the 
overarching mandate of the CZMA, nor against what kinds of 
impacts or harms NEPA or the CZMA is supposed to protect. 
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be drawn from them.'"  Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 
1016 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).  
 We have plenary review over the district court's grant 
of summary judgment.  Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. 
Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 76 (3d Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).  "[T]he appellate court is 
required to apply the same test the district court should have 
utilized initially.  Inferences to be drawn from the underlying 
facts contained in the evidential sources submitted to the trial 
court must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion."  Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 
566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). 
III. 
 In its NEPA claims, NJDEPE contends that the NRC and 
the Coast Guard, through granting various licenses and permits, 
allowed transport of radioactive material without adequate 
environmental impact assessment. 
 A.  The National Environmental Policy Act 
 NEPA aims to encourage "harmony between man and his 
environment,"  to "prevent or eliminate damage to the 
environment" and to "stimulate [human] health and welfare."  42 
U.S.C. § 4321.  To this end, it structures governmental 
decisionmaking in two respects: 
"First, it places upon an agency the obligation to 
consider every significant aspect of the environmental 
impact of a proposed action.  Second, it ensures that 
the agency will inform the public that it has indeed 
considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking 
process."   
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Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 725 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983)) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted).  At issue here is NEPA's provision requiring that all 
federal agencies: 
include in every recommendation or report on proposals 
for legislation and other major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible 
official on -- 
(i)  the environmental impact of the proposed 
action, 
(ii)  any adverse environmental effects which 
cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented, 
(iii)  alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term 
uses of man's environment and the maintenance and 
enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments 
of resources which would be involved in the 
proposed action should it be implemented. 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).   
 The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), established 
under NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4342, has promulgated regulations to 
guide agencies in addressing the threshold question of whether a 
particular action must be accompanied by the "detailed statement" 
described in § 4332(2)(C), called an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS).0  See generally 40 C.F.R. Parts 1507, 1508. When 
considering a major action, the regulations require that "an 
agency must undertake a comprehensive assessment of the expected 
                     
0These regulations were made binding on all agencies by Executive 
Order No. 11991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978), and are entitled to 
substantial deference even if they conflict with another agency's 
interpretation of NEPA, Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 
(1978).  See also Morris County Trust for Historic Preservation 
v. Pierce, 714 F.2d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 1983). 
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effects of [the] proposed action before it can determine whether 
that action is `significant' for NEPA purposes."  Township of 
Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas. Co., 687 F.2d 
732, 740 (1982).  Agencies are directed to designate which 
classes of actions normally require EIS's, which classes normally 
require no environmental evaluation and may be regarded as 
categorical exclusions, and which classes fall in the middle and 
require Environmental Assessments (EA's) to determine whether 
they will have a significant impact and thus require EIS's.  40 
C.F.R. § 1507.3(b)(2).  An EA provides either a determination 
that the action will have a significant environmental impact and 
hence requires an EIS, or a "finding of no significant impact" 
(FONSI) indicating that no EIS is needed.  Id. § 1508.9(a)(1); 
Lower Alloways Creek, 687 F.2d at 740.  "Thus, as a screening 
device, the environmental assessment allows agencies with limited 
resources to focus on truly important federal actions."   Lower 
Alloways Creek, 687 F.2d at 740 n.17 (internal quotations, 
alteration, and citation omitted). 
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  B.  Claim against the NRC 
  1.  Application of the Hobbs Act 
 The gravamen of NJDEPE's NEPA claims is that the 
federal agencies involved in approving LIPA's fuel shipment did 
not analyze the environmental impact of the method and route of 
transportation or weigh transportation alternatives, as required 
by 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).  The district court held it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction.  We agree.  The Hobbs Act provides: 
 The court of appeals . . . has exclusive 
jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or 
in part), or to determine the validity of -- 
. . .  
(4) all final orders of the [NRC]0 
made reviewable by section 2239 of 
title 42 . . . . 
28 U.S.C. § 2342.  Section 2239 provides for review of NRC final 
orders granting, suspending, revoking or amending licenses, or 
issuing or modifying rules dealing with the activities of 
licensees.  Thus, the Hobbs Act requires "initial court of 
appeals review of all final orders in licensing proceedings." 
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985). 
The act "should be liberally construed to allow exclusive 
jurisdiction in the court of appeals."  Conoco, Inc. v. Skinner, 
970 F.2d 1206, 1214 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 The district court treated NJDEPE's claim of inadequate 
environmental assessment as essentially a challenge to the 
                     
0The act here refers to the Atomic Energy Commission. Congress 
abolished the Atomic Energy Commission and transferred its 
licensing and regulatory functions to the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission in 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801, 5841 (1988), so this 
provision now applies to the NRC.  See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 
462 U.S. at 90 n.2. 
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validity of two final NRC orders:  the approval of PECo's license 
amendment and the issuance of a Certificate of Compliance to 
Pacific Nuclear Systems for its radioactive material containers. 
The court held those orders, and their accompanying environmental 
assessments, could only be challenged by petition to the court of 
appeals. 
 NJDEPE contends that because the NRC tried to avoid 
issuing a reviewable final order by fragmenting its 
decisionmaking, its action falls within an exception to the Hobbs 
Act and is reviewable in the district court.  In the alternative, 
it argues that even if the district court lacked jurisdiction, we 
should view its appeal as a petition for review under the Hobbs 
Act, and hear its claims.  Finally, NJDEPE maintains that its 
original claim asserted a NEPA violation by the Coast Guard over 
which the district court had jurisdiction. 
  2.  Fragmented decisionmaking 
 NJDEPE bases its fragmented decisionmaking claim on 
Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 
619 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981). 
There, a residents' association challenged an attempt to build 
and operate a water decontamination system to process radioactive 
water that accumulated after the Three Mile Island accident.  The 
Alliance feared that partially decontaminated water would be 
released into the environment.  Among its claims was that the NRC 
was violating NEPA by authorizing construction of the system to 
begin before preparation of an environmental evaluation of its 
disposal plan.  The Alliance argued that the NRC was fragmenting 
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its decisionmaking -- it was delaying a final decision on how it 
would resolve the disposal problem, thereby eluding the scrutiny 
of an EIS, but nevertheless it had tacitly elected a partial 
solution through allowing construction of the decontamination 
system.  Postponing preparation of an EIS until private parties 
had been permitted to expend large sums on construction, the 
Alliance said, would distort the final evaluation and choice of 
solution by the NRC and any reviewing court.  Id. at 239-40.  Yet 
because the case was still under consideration, there was no 
final order the Alliance could challenge under the Hobbs Act. Id. 
at 236. 
 We stated, "Segmentation of a large or cumulative 
project into smaller components in order to avoid designating the 
project a major federal action has been held to be unlawful," and 
then considered whether the district court had jurisdiction to 
compel NRC compliance with NEPA by prohibiting segmentation and 
forcing the preparation of an EIS.  Id. at 240.  We held that the 
NRC's discretion on the timing of its EIS was not unfettered, and 
that the district court was the proper forum for development of 
the record needed to determine when, under NEPA, the EIS was 
required.  We concluded that "a claim that NRC is not complying 
with the National Environmental Policy Act states a cause of 
action over which the district courts have subject matter 
jurisdiction."  Id. at 241. 
 NJDEPE contends similar fragmented decisionmaking in 
this case confers district court jurisdiction.  NJDEPE argues it 
was left without a final order to challenge because no agency was 
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willing to acknowledge approving the barge shipments along the 
New Jersey coast or reviewed the environmental impact of these 
shipments and alternatives, and that therefore it may ask the 
district court to compel compliance with NEPA. 
 The record demonstrates otherwise.  The NRC has not 
avoided its NEPA obligations by refusing to issue final orders. 
Rather, the NRC has issued several final orders connected with 
the Shoreham decommissioning; and one of these, PECo's license 
amendment, conveyed permission to transport the fuel, and 
included an appropriate EA.0  What NJDEPE is really challenging 
is not the lack of NRC assessment but the way the NRC has 
evaluated the method and route of transport. 
 Under NRC regulations, the June 23, 1993 PECo license 
amendment to receive the Shoreham fuel also constituted a license 
to transport it.  Any holder of an NRC license to receive and 
possess nuclear fuel is the beneficiary of a general NRC license 
"to transport, or to deliver to a carrier for transport," the 
material, using proper procedures and equipment.  10 C.F.R. 
§71.12(a) & (b).   
 Appropriately, then, the NRC's Environmental Assessment 
of the proposed amendment allowing receipt of the fuel analyzed 
the environmental impact.  The analysis applied 10 C.F.R. §51.52, 
"Environmental effects of transportation of fuel and waste -- 
Table S-4."  Table S-4 provides a generic analysis of the 
                     
0In evaluating the impact of its actions under NEPA the NRC 
follows the CEQ guidelines.  10 C.F.R. § 51.10(a).  Amendments to 
licenses granted here require EA's.  Id. § 51.20-51.22.   
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environmental impact of such transport.  If a transportation plan 
meets the standards set out in Table S-4, the transportation of 
the materials is deemed to have no significant impact.  The 
Environmental Assessment detailed how "[t]he proposed shipments 
meet the conditions specified in 10 C.F.R. 51.52(a)," and 
concluded the environmental impact of the transportation would be 
as set forth in the table, and that this impact would be 
"minimal."  58 Fed. Reg. 29010, 29011 (1993). 
 The fragmented decisionmaking argument relies on a 
claim that the agency avoided environmental analysis of an action 
by not making a final decision, so the argument is foreclosed if 
a final decision authorizing the action is identified.  Because 
the NRC, through the PECo amendment, made a final decision to 
license transportation of the irradiated fuel after analyzing the 
impact of transportation in the EA, Susquehanna cannot apply.0 
 NJDEPE argues that Table S-4's generic approach is 
inadequate under NEPA, which instead requires case by case 
analysis of transportation methods and routes; and that Table S-
4, by its own terms, is inapplicable here.  We do not reach the 
merits of these arguments because, even if true, neither 
justifies the invocation of Susquehanna to lift the Hobbs Act's 
                     
0NJDEPE shows it is aware of this logic by its efforts to deny 
that it is challenging any order in particular.  For example, it 
states it "has no quarrel with and therefore has no interest in 
challenging PECo's license amendment which does not appear to 
approve a transportation route through New Jersey's waters; it 
instead appears merely to allow PECo to receive and possess the 
subject fuel."  Brief for NJDEPE at 23. 
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jurisdictional bar, for both constitute a challenge to a final 
NRC order.  
 NJDEPE's contention that generic evaluation of the 
impact of radioactive materials transport does not satisfy NEPA 
is at the center of its NEPA claims.  The NRC maintains the S-4 
Table correctly concludes, based on extensive study, that any 
transport by barge, rail, or truck meeting certain requirements0 
will have no significant environmental impact, so that there is 
no need to consider various possible routes and methods of 
transportation.0  In support, the NRC cites to Baltimore Gas & 
                     
0Radioactive materials shipments must meet NRC standards for 
radiation emission levels, 10 C.F.R. § 51.52, packaging, see 
generally Id. Part 71,   including standards for lifting and 
tieing-down packages and for external radiation levels, id. Part 
71 Subpart E.  The regulations also require specific tests of 
packages under "normal conditions" and "hypothetical accident 
conditions."  Id. Part 71 Subpart F.   
 
0Among the studies supporting Table S-4 is "Environmental Survey 
of Transportation of Radioactive Materials to and from Nuclear 
Power Plants,"  WASH-1238 (1972), J.A. at 328.  It estimates 
radiation dosages to transportation workers and the general 
public from transport by truck, rail, and barge, and considers 
the odds and effects of different kinds of accidents by each mode 
of transport.  Calculations are based on transportation in 
approved packaging.  The conclusion is that the risk of accident 
for any form of transportation is about 1 in a million per 
vehicle mile, and that only 1% of these accidents would involve a 
severe impact or fire.  Id. at 9, J.A. at 330.  While the study 
notes that effects of an accident would depend on, among other 
things, the population density where the accident occurred, and 
that requirements for special routing were considered, it states 
that the advantages of requiring special routing of shipments 
were determined to be too small to merit implementation.  Id. at 
10, J.A. at 331. 
 NJDEPE "does not really quarrel with LIPA's contention 
that the study purportedly supporting Table S-4 (the table upon 
which the subject environmental assessment allegedly was based) 
concludes that the chances of a barge accident resulting in the 
release of a significant amount of radiation are relatively 
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Elec., 462 U.S. at 101, where the Supreme Court approved a 
generic evaluation by the NRC of the impact of the storage of 
solid nuclear waste, commenting, "[t]he generic method chosen by 
the agency is clearly an appropriate method of conducting the 
`hard look' required by NEPA."  In response, NJDEPE cites to 
Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1989), 
where we overturned the NRC's generic policy that an EIS for a 
nuclear plant need not consider the plant's "severe accident 
mitigation design alternatives."  Observing that the impact of 
such design alternatives would vary with each plant's design and 
the population density of its environs, we stated, "it is 
axiomatic that the generic approach of Baltimore Gas will not 
suffice where the underlying issues are not generic."  Id. at 
738.  NJDEPE contends that the underlying issues determining the 
impact of transportation of radioactive waste are similarly not 
generic, because the impact depends on the population levels each 
route passes through and the risks of accident for each method of 
transportation. 
 Whether or not this argument has merit, it does not 
support a claim of fragmented decisionmaking by which the NRC has 
avoided evaluating the impact of the transportation.  This 
evaluation has taken place, and NJDEPE's complaint challenges the 
method of evaluation prescribed by the rule, Table S-4, and the 
evaluation's conclusion.  Count I of the complaint therefore 
challenges a final order of the NRC, over which the court of 
                                                                  
slight."  Reply Brief for NJDEPE at 17.  Rather, it disputes the 
use of the table in this situation. 
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appeals, not the district court, has jurisdiction.  Furthermore, 
while we do not rule on PECo's and the United States' argument 
that NJDEPE was required to exhaust all administrative remedies 
before petitioning for review in this court, we note that a 
number of administrative avenues might also have provided 
relief.0  NJDEPE could have petitioned the NRC for a new 
rulemaking process under 10 C.F.R. § 2.802(a), which provides 
that "[a]ny interested person may petition the Commission to 
issue, amend or rescind any regulation."  Alternatively, NJDEPE 
could have petitioned for a waiver of or exception to application 
of Table S-4 in PECo's license proceeding under 10 C.F.R. 
§2.758(b).  To do so, it would have had to file a petition to 
intervene as an interested party in the proceeding under 10 
C.F.R. § 2.714.0  Indeed, on October 8, before oral argument, 
NJDEPE filed such a petition.  See 58 Fed. Reg. 58203 (1993). 
Finally, NJDEPE could have petitioned to modify, suspend, or 
                     
0Even if exhaustion of administrative remedies is required, we do 
not condemn parties in NJDEPE's position to entanglement in 
administrative proceedings until their objections are moot.  We 
have previously commented that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651 
(1988), appears to allow the court of appeals to grant pendente 
lite relief to preserve the status quo while the NRC considers 
petitions such as those suggested below.  Susquehanna, 619 F.2d 
at 237 (citing FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 604-05 (1966) 
(28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) authorizes courts of appeals to issue 
preliminary injunctions preserving status quo pending final 
agency action in matters over which they had exclusive review 
jurisdiction under Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1976))). 
0NJDEPE did not seek to intervene before the amendment was issued 
on June 23, 1993, but claims it did not learn of the plan to ship 
by barge until around that date.  It could have petitioned to 
intervene even after the amendment was issued, under the 
provision for late intervention for good cause.  10 C.F.R. § 
2.714(a)(1). 
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revoke PECo's amended license under 10 C.F.R. § 2.206, alleging a 
license violation or "potentially hazardous conditions or other 
facts deemed to be sufficient ground for the proposed action," 
id. § 2.202(a)(1). 
 Our resolution of NJDEPE's second argument against the 
NRC's use of Table S-4, that the rule "on its face is 
inapplicable to the issue of how to transfer partially spent fuel 
from one reactor for use at another," is similar.  NJDEPE 
contends that Table S-4 refers to shipment of radioactive waste 
from a reactor, not to transfer of partially irradiated fuel 
between reactors.  The NRC responds that the fuel here is less 
radioactive than fully irradiated waste, and cites to its 
previous decisions that the table is equally applicable to 
shipment of fuel between reactors.0  Regardless of the merits, 
this is a challenge to the NRC's application of a rule in its 
evaluation of the transportation, demonstrating that there was an 
evaluation to challenge, and that the NRC did not fragment its 
decisionmaking. 
 In sum, NJDEPE's real complaint is not that there is no 
final order to challenge, but rather that it disagrees with the 
NRC's form of analysis and conclusions.  These challenges cannot 
                     
0See In re Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), 
ALAB-825, 22 N.R.C. 785, 793 (1985) (rejecting contention that 
Table S-4 only applies where spent fuel is shipped from reactor 
to reprocessing plant, stating, "the [NRC]'s generic 
determination of transportation impacts in the regulation is 
equally applicable to the transshipment of spent fuel between 
reactors as well as to a hypothetical reprocessing facility 
because it is the same fuel regardless of destination."); accord 
In re Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power 
Plant), ALAB-837, 23 N.R.C. 525, 544 (1986). 
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be maintained in the district court, because the Hobbs Act 
mandates "initial court of appeals review of all final orders in 
licensing proceedings."  Florida Power & Light Co., 470 U.S. at 
737. 
  3.  The appeal as a Hobbs Act petition 
      to the Court of Appeals 
 
 NJDEPE contends that even if the district court 
correctly dismissed its claims against the NRC for lack of 
jurisdiction, its appeal may be taken as a petition for review of 
the NRC's final orders, invoking the exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction of the court of appeals.  The Hobbs Act provides, 
"Jurisdiction [in the court of appeals] is invoked by filing a 
petition as provided by [28 U.S.C. §] 2344."  28 U.S.C. § 2342. 
Section 2344 requires a petition for review of an order to be 
filed with the appellate court within 60 days after the order's 
entry, and to specify the nature of the proceeding for which 
review is sought.  Id. § 2344 (1988).  Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 15(a), "Petition for Review of Order; Joint Petition," 
which according to the Advisory Committee note supersedes 28 
U.S.C. § 2344, also requires specification of the order for which 
review is sought.0  NJDEPE has not complied with these 
procedures. 
 By itself, NJDEPE's appeal allows us to consider 
whether the district court's dismissal of the claim against the 
                     
0Rule 15(a) does not specify the time limit for bringing 
petitions for review, but we apply the 60-day limit from § 2344. 
See Conoco, 970 F.2d at 1213 n.8 (applying § 2344's 60-day limit 
after adoption of Rule 15(a)). 
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NRC was proper, not to consider the merits of the claim.  Just as 
when the lower federal court improperly asserts jurisdiction, 
"`we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely 
for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in 
entertaining the suit,'"  Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 
475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (quoting United States v. Corrick, 298 
U.S. 435, 440 (1936)), when the lower court has properly found it 
lacked jurisdiction, we have appellate jurisdiction not of the 
merits but merely for the purpose of affirming the court's 
dismissal.   
 Nor can NJDEPE's appeal serve as a stand-in for a Hobbs 
Act petition for review.  NJDEPE's notice of appeal was filed 
October 13, 1993, well beyond 60 days from the June 23, 1993 
order, and more than 60 days from August 9, when NJDEPE 
indisputably learned from LIPA's application for a New Jersey 
Certificate of Handling that shipments would be by barge.  Even 
in a proper petition, this delay would be fatal, for "[t]he 60 
day period for seeking judicial review set forth in the Hobbs Act 
is jurisdictional in nature, and may not be enlarged or altered 
by the courts."  Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 666 
F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  Furthermore, the notice of 
appeal would be substantively deficient as a petition for review, 
for it challenges the district court's ruling, rather than 
"designat[ing] . . . the [agency] order or part thereof to be 
reviewed."  Fed. R. App. P. 15(a).  For these reasons, we will 
affirm the district court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction, 
and will not review the merits of the claim.  See Conoco, 970 
27 
F.2d at 1213, 1216 (affirming Hobbs Act dismissal of claims 
against Maritime Administration and Coast Guard, and taking 
jurisdiction only of claim against Maritime Administration which 
had also been raised in protective petition for review), and at 
1213 n.8 (noting that appeal came more than 60 days after the 
Coast Guard order being challenged, thus exceeding 28 U.S.C. 
§2342's time limit for petitions for review); Bucks County Cable 
TV, Inc. v. United States, 427 F.2d 438, 442 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970) (declining to review under Hobbs Act 
district court's exercise of jurisdiction of claim against 
Federal Communications Commission because plaintiff-appellant had 
also filed timely petitions for review with court of appeals); 
Green v. Brantley, 981 F.2d 514, 521 n.2 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(holding district court lacked jurisdiction of appellee's claim 
against Federal Aviation Administration because 49 U.S.C. § 1486 
gave appellate court exclusive jurisdiction; declining to accept 
appeal as a petition for review);  see also California Save Our 
Streams Council, Inc. v. Yeutter, 887 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(upholding district court finding of lack of jurisdiction over 
claims against Federal Energy Regulatory Commission because 16 
U.S.C. § 825l(b) confers exclusive jurisdiction on circuit 
courts; remanding without holding that appeal could serve as 
petition to review FERC decision). 
 C.  Claim against the Coast Guard 
 Because it read NJDEPE's NEPA claims in Count I as a 
challenge to final orders of the NRC, the district court 
dismissed the count for lack of jurisdiction.  But in that count, 
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NJDEPE stated its NEPA claim jointly against the NRC and the 
Coast Guard.0  We will therefore address the separate claim that 
the Coast Guard violated NEPA.  Although we find jurisdiction in 
                     
0The complaint stated, "NRC and the Coast Guard failed to comply 
with the clear nondiscretionary requirements of NEPA and NEPA's 
implementing regulations when they approved the proposed shipment 
of fuel from LIPA to PECo without assessing the risks and 
alternatives of the transfer and transport of LIPA's fuel." 
Verified Complaint ¶ 30 at 18, J.A. at 23. 
 It is not clear that NJDEPE stated an independent NEPA 
claim against the Coast Guard.  At some points it appears NJDEPE 
merely claims the Coast Guard and the NRC fragmented 
decisionmaking among themselves so that neither performed a major 
federal action, and neither took responsibility for allowing 
transport of the fuel.  On appeal NJDEPE states:  
NJDEPE's claim is not that the Coast Guard on 
its own committed an independent violation of 
NEPA, but instead that it, together with the 
NRC, violated NEPA through various actions 
and inactions, the combination of which 
resulted in LIPA's being allowed to transport 
its nuclear fuel through New Jersey's coastal 
waters without any analysis of the impact of 
that transportation on those waters. 
Reply Brief for NJDEPE at 18-19.  Thus construed, NJDEPE's NEPA 
complaint against the Coast Guard and the NRC is a variation of 
the Susquehanna fragmented decisionmaking claim.  In Susquehanna 
we addressed a single agency's fragmentation of a decision to 
take a major action into a number of smaller decisions in order 
to avoid NEPA obligations; here NJDEPE's theory appears to be 
that NEPA is violated where a number of agencies fragment a major 
federal action into smaller, non-major decisions, hence avoiding 
the environmental analysis of the action required under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332.   
 We need not reach the merits of this theory of NEPA 
liability, for as our discussion above indicates, such 
fragmentation is not present in this case.  We have found the NRC 
did issue a final order authorizing the transport of the nuclear 
fuel, the PECo license amendment, and took responsibility under 
NEPA by performing an "analysis of the impact of that 
transportation on those waters."  Hence, any claim that the Coast 
Guard, though it took no major action, violated NEPA through 
fragmentation of a major action with the NRC must fail.  We give 
NJDEPE the benefit of the doubt, however, and also assume it 
alleges the Coast Guard on its own took a major federal action 
significantly affecting the environment. 
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the district court would have been proper, the Coast Guard is 
entitled to summary judgment on the claim. 
 The Hobbs Act does not bar district court jurisdiction 
of this claim against the Coast Guard.  The action challenged is 
that of the Captain of the Port of Long Island Sound, in granting 
conditional approval of LIPA's Operations Plan that described the 
planned barge shipments.   Although the Hobbs Act grants 
exclusive jurisdiction in the court of appeals over certain 
rules, regulations, and orders of the Secretary of 
Transportation0 relating to the nationality of ship ownership, it 
does not so limit jurisdiction of challenges to Coast Guard 
maritime safety activities.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2342(3)(A) (1988).   
 The district court had jurisdiction of this claim.  We 
stated in Susquehanna that "[e]nforcement of the environmental 
impact statement requirement generally has been assumed to be 
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts," 
Susquehanna Valley Alliance, 619 F.2d 231, 240 (1980), a holding 
as applicable to the Coast Guard action here as it was to the NRC 
action in Susquehanna.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1361, and 5 
U.S.C. §§ 701-06. 
 The United States contends the Coast Guard was under no 
NEPA obligation because it did not take a major federal action, 
and that even if NEPA does apply, Coast Guard NEPA implementation 
guidelines identify operations to carry out statutory marine 
                     
0Except during times of war and as otherwise declared by the 
President, the Coast Guard is a service in the Department of 
Transportation.  14 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1988). 
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safety duties as "categorical exclusions" that do not require 
Environmental Impact Statements.  We agree there was no major 
federal action by the Coast Guard, and therefore it was not 
required to perform an environmental assessment or environmental 
impact statement.0  We do not reach the categorical exclusion 
argument.0 
 LIPA submitted its Operations Plan to the Captain of 
the Port of Long Island Sound June 7, 1993.  The cover letter 
stated, "This proprietary submittal has been developed in 
accordance with the guidance in American National Standard for 
                     
0This court has previously reserved decision on the question of 
the standard of review to be applied to an agency's decision not 
to prepare an environmental impact statement.  See, e.g., Morris 
County Trust for Historic Preservation v. Pierce, 714 F.2d 271, 
278 n.5 (3d Cir. 1983); Township of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 
F.2d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 1983).  We will do so here also, as there 
is no need resolve the issue to decide the case:  we find the 
Coast Guard's decision here to be reasonable under the 
circumstances, so it necessarily satisfies the lower abuse of 
discretion standard as well. 
0It is not clear whether the Captain of the Port's approval of 
LIPA's Operation Plan would qualify as a categorical exclusion 
under the Coast Guard's procedures.  Paragraph 2.B.2.c. of 
Commandant Instruction M1 6475.1B lists "[a]ctions performed as a 
part of Coast Guard operations to carry out statutory authority 
in the areas of maritime safety [or] protection of the 
environment" as categorically excluded from the EA or EIS 
requirement because they have no significant effect on the 
environment.  However the Instruction also states that an EA or 
EIS should be prepared for otherwise excluded actions that are 
"likely to involve . . . substantial controversy because of 
effects on the human environment."  We note that there is no 
indication that these procedures were published for public review 
and comment as required by 5 U.S.C. § 553, and so do not have the 
status of rules.  See also 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(a) (agency 
procedures for NEPA implementation shall be adopted only after 
opportunity for public review).  At any rate, whether the Coast 
Guard would call its action a categorical exclusion or not, we 
find the action did not amount to a major federal action 
entailing NEPA obligations.   
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Highway Route Controlled Quantities of Radioactive Materials --
Domestic Barge Transport, ANSI N14.24-1985."  J.A. at 156.  The 
plan detailed equipment and facilities to be used, communications 
procedures, emergency response plans, radiation safety 
procedures, security measures, and the route of travel. 
 The Captain, H. Bruce Dickey, responded on July 27, 
1993, that he had reviewed the shipping plan and stated, "final 
approval is contingent on satisfactory internal structural 
inspections of the Loveland barges to be used for the fuel 
shipments."  J.A. 159.  The letter continued with instructions on 
reporting positions and emergencies during shipping.   
 We find this exchange between the Coast Guard and LIPA 
does not amount to a major federal action, and therefore § 4332, 
which requires an environmental impact statement for "major 
Federal actions significantly affecting . . . the human 
environment," does not apply.  Where a non-federal party 
voluntarily informs a federal agency of its intended activities 
to ensure that they will comply with law and regulation, and to 
facilitate the agency's monitoring of the activities for safety 
purposes, the agency's review of the plan does not constitute a 
major federal action.0  Here, it is clear that LIPA's submission 
                     
0This court has set forth a dual standard for determining whether 
an environmental impact statement is required:  we consider 
whether a federal action is "major," in terms of the level of 
federal resources and authority committed to it, and whether it 
"significantly" affects the environment.  NAACP v. Medical Ctr., 
Inc., 584 F.2d 619, 627 (3d Cir. 1978).  We recognize that the 
Council on Environmental Quality has interpreted § 4332(2)(C) as 
setting forth a unitary standard: "Major Federal action includes 
actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially 
subject to Federal control. Major reinforces but does not have a 
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of its Operations Plan was not required for it to ship the fuel.  
The American National Standards Institute standard on barge 
transport of radioactive materials under which LIPA submitted its 
Operations Plan does not set out legal requirements; rather, it 
states, "The use of American National Standards is completely 
voluntary."  Brief for Federal Appellees, Addendum II.  
                                                                  
meaning independent of significantly."  40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 
(citation omitted); see also 43 Fed. Reg. 55978, 55989 (1978).  
Despite our deference to the CEQ's regulations, Andrus v. Sierra 
Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1978), we question its interpretation of 
NEPA in this instance, for the reasons we set out in NAACP: 
First, the two-pronged approach follows the 
statutory language more closely than the 
unitary approach; second, the unitary 
approach would give virtually no effect to 
the word "major," and thus would run counter 
to the requirement that a court give effect 
to all words of a statute when construing it; 
and third, the Government reasonably could 
have concluded that a minimal federal 
relationship to a project having an 
environmental impact would not warrant 
expenditure of scarce resources and critical 
time for preparation of a needless impact 
statement. 
N.A.A.C.P., 584 F.2d at 627.  This court and others have 
continued to use the dual standard.  See Lower Alloways, 687 F.2d 
at 740 n.15.  Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Comm'n, 959 F.2d 508, 512 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Only 
proposals for a `major' federal action therefore require review 
by an agency under NEPA," (citing NAACP, 584 F.2d at 634)); 
Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(holding agency's approval of mining proposals constituted 
marginal, not major, federal action, so that agency was not 
subject to NEPA requirements).  We need not resolve the conflict 
at this point, however, because the CEQ's definition would not 
lead us to a different result.  Even using that definition, we 
would focus on the federal action, not the action of a private 
party.  Where the federal agency lacks authority to control the 
private activity, and is merely involved in an advisory capacity 
at the request of the private party, there is no "action[] with 
effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to 
Federal control." 
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Similarly, the Coast Guard circular on barge transportation of 
radioactive materials states that the ANSI standard "advises" 
shippers to consult the Coast Guard regarding emergency response 
plans, and explains, "This standard is intended to be a voluntary 
industry standard."  J.A. at 154.0 
 Federal approval of a private party's project, where 
that approval is not required for the project to go forward, does 
not constitute a major federal action.0  In NAACP, we described 
three classes of agency actions requiring environmental analysis 
under NEPA:  first, where the agency itself undertook a project; 
second, where the agency supported a project by contract, grant, 
loan, or other financial assistance; and third, where the agency 
enabled the project by lease, license, permit, or other 
                     
0Our conclusion that permission from the Coast Guard for shipment 
of the Shoreham fuel was not required is fortified by reference 
to regulations that categorize certain materials, such as the 
uranium-235 at issue here, as "dangerous cargo," 33 C.F.R. § 
126.07; 49 C.F.R. § 172.101, and other material, particularly 
certain explosives, as "designated dangerous cargo," 33 C.F.R. 
§126.09.  The Coast Guard has promulgated by regulation a general 
handling permit for "dangerous cargo."  Id. § 126.27.  For 
"designated dangerous cargo," however, the Captain of the Port 
must issue a permit for each transaction (handling, storage, 
etc.) involving the material, id. § 126.19.  Thus, the Coast 
Guard has apparently made a conscious choice not to engage in 
licensing activities with respect to the material at issue here. 
 
0The CEQ lists categories into which federal actions "tend to 
fall," and among these is "[a]pproval of specific projects . . . 
. Projects include actions approved by permit or other regulatory 
decision as well as federal and federally assisted activities." 
40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(4).  It does not, however, define 
approval.  Regardless of whether § 1508.18(b)(4) would designate 
a non-required, voluntarily sought approval as a federal action, 
such an approval is not a major federal action. 
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entitlement for use.0  NAACP, 584 F.2d at 630.  In NAACP, the 
Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had 
approved a hospital's capital expenditure plan after 
certification by local and state officials that the renovation 
and expansion were necessary.  Without this approval, the 
Secretary might have withheld a portion of federal payments for 
patient charges under Medicare, Medicaid, and other health 
programs.  The plaintiffs claimed the Secretary should have filed 
an environmental impact statement before issuing his approval. 
Id. at 624.   
 As here, the question in NAACP regarded the third 
category of action:  whether the government had enabled the 
project in such a way as to constitute a major federal action. 
Observing that the hospital could have legally pursued its 
renovation and expansion without the Secretary's approval, and 
that the Secretary's duties of approval were ministerial once the 
state agencies had approved the expenditure as necessary and did 
not include the discretion to consider environmental impacts of 
the project, we held there was no major federal action.  We 
explained, "When the agency `enables' another to impact on the 
environment, the court must ascertain whether the agency action 
is a legal requirement for the other party to affect the 
environment and whether the agency has any discretion to take 
                     
0We note that where an agency imposes a de facto requirement that 
it grant approval before a private action is taken, through, for 
example, a policy governing its exercise of discretionary 
authority, this may be the equivalent of a legal requirement that 
the private party seeking to act must obtain a license or permit. 
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environmental considerations into account before acting."  Id. at 
634 (emphasis added).  We also rejected the argument that the 
Secretary's approval was a major federal action because, for 
financial reasons, the renovation and expansion would not be 
undertaken but for his approval.  The classification of enabling 
action as major federal action "does not extend to Government 
action which amounts to less than a legal precondition," we 
explained.  Id. at 632. 
 Other courts have also held that where federal 
approvals are not legal predicates to private actions, the 
approvals are not major federal actions entailing NEPA 
obligations.  In Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n, a citizen's group 
challenged the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) 
certification of a proposed waste-to-energy facility as a "co-
generation facility."  This certification gave the facility the 
right to deal with the local electric utility at favorable rates, 
and, according to the citizens, was critical to the facility's 
economic viability.  959 F.2d at 513.  The Fourth Circuit stated, 
"a non-federal project is considered a `federal action' if it 
cannot begin or continue without prior approval by a federal 
agency and the agency possesses authority to exercise discretion 
over the outcome."  Id. at 512 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  Noting that the facility received no direct 
federal assistance, that FERC's certification was a ministerial 
determination based on technical and ownership qualifications, 
and that the facility legally could have been built without 
certification, the court affirmed FERC's determination that there 
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was no major federal action for NEPA purposes.  Id. at 513-14. 
See also Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 
1988) (where Bureau of Land Management required advance notice of 
development of gold mine and monitored compliance with 
environmental rules, but could not require approval before 
development of mine began, federal action "marginal" rather than 
"major"); Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation 
Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (5th Cir. 
1974) (no major federal action where state sought Army Corps of 
Engineers' opinion on effect of highway project on flood control 
and Corps responded it had no objection, but where there was no 
legal requirement that state seek Corps approval), cert. denied, 
420 U.S. 926 (1975). 
 In the converse situation, we have held that where a 
federal agency has legal control over a private project, its 
approval can amount to a major federal action.  Where the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) had approved 
and contracted to finance a town's urban renewal project before 
NEPA's 1969 enactment, and the town's development authority voted 
in 1980 to demolish a historical building, a preservation 
organization claimed NEPA required HUD to perform an 
environmental analysis.  Morris County Trust, 714 F.2d 271 (3d 
Cir. 1983).  We found HUD had continuing authority over the 
project, because the loan contract required the development 
authority to submit data on proposed actions to HUD, and HUD in 
turn could withhold payment if it found an action violated 
federal law or regulation.  Therefore HUD was required to 
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consider the environmental effects of its action under § 4332 and 
related regulations.  Id. at 278.  See also Davis v. Morton, 469 
F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972) (Department of Interior performed major 
federal action by approving lease of Indian lands, where approval 
was required by statute).  Here, the Coast Guard approval was not 
required before the shipments could take place, so the Coast 
Guard did not have control over them.0  The Coast Guard did not, 
therefore, perform a major federal action in relation to the 
shipments, and was not obligated to analyze their environmental 
impact under NEPA. 
IV. 
 NJDEPE claims that the NRC, the Coast Guard, LIPA, and 
PECo violated the Coastal Zone Management Act requirement 
conditioning certain federal licenses and permits on submission 
of "consistency certifications" showing that proposed activities 
                     
0As discussed below, the Coast Guard possesses a number of 
discretionary enforcement powers it conceivably could have 
applied to the LIPA shipment, but did not.  NJDEPE only mentions 
these in relation to the CZMA claim, but we note that such 
enforcement powers do not give the Coast Guard ongoing legal 
control of the shipments for NEPA purposes.  Indeed, the Coast 
Guard's non-action in this regard does not constitute federal 
action at all under NEPA.  According to the CEQ, federal 
"[a]ctions include the circumstance where the responsible 
officials fail to act and that failure to act is reviewable by 
courts or administrative tribunals under the Administrative 
Procedure Act or other applicable law as agency action."  40 
C.F.R. § 1508.18.  Here, the Coast Guard's "decision not to take 
enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review 
under" the Administrative Procedure Act.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 
U.S. 821, 832 (1985).  See also Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 
627 F.2d 1238 (1980) (Secretary of Interior's decision not to 
exercise power to stop state's wolf-killing program not a major 
federal action); Alaska v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(same). 
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comply with the state's coastal management program.  NJDEPE wants 
LIPA and PECo ordered to submit consistency certifications.  The 
claim against the NRC that its licenses to LIPA (regarding the 
decommissioning of Shoreham) and PECo (regarding receipt of the 
fuel) violate the CZMA are, like the other claims against the 
NRC, jurisdictionally barred from the district court and hence 
will have to be dismissed.0  We will affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to the Coast Guard on the CZMA claim, 
and instruct the district court to dismiss the CZMA claim against 
LIPA and PECo.   
 A.  The Coastal Zone Management Act 
 The CZMA aims to preserve, protect, and restore the 
nation's coast, in part by encouraging and assisting states in 
the development of coastal zone management programs.  16 U.S.C. 
§1452(1)&(2).  To promote cooperation by federal agencies with 
state management efforts, it provides that any applicant for a 
federal license or permit to conduct an activity that will affect 
the coastal zone: 
shall provide in the application to the licensing or 
permitting agency a certification that the proposed 
activity complies with the enforceable policies of the 
state's approved program and that such activity will be 
conducted in a manner consistent with the [state's 
approved coastal management] program.0 
                     
0The district court did not specifically address the CZMA claims 
against the NRC, LIPA, or PECo in its opinion. 
0The statute also states a general 
cooperation requirement: Each Federal agency 
activity within or outside the coastal zone 
that affects any land or water use or natural 
resource of the coastal zone shall be carried 
out in a manner which is consistent to the 
maximum extent practicable with the 
39 
Id. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).  The statute sets out 
procedures for granting or withholding the federal license 
depending on the judgment of the state and the Secretary of 
Commerce with respect to the proposal's consistency with the 
state program.  Id. 
 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) of the Commerce Department has promulgated regulations 
implementing the CZMA's consistency requirements.  15 C.F.R. Part 
930.  The regulations require state agencies to develop a list of 
federal license and permit activities that are likely to affect 
the coastal zone and that the state wishes to review for 
consistency.  The list is included in the state's management 
program, which is submitted to the Secretary of Commerce for 
approval.  15 C.F.R. § 930.53(b).  The list may be amended by the 
state after consultation with the affected federal agency and 
approval of the Assistant Administrator of NOAA.  15 C.F.R. 
§930.53(d).  States are also directed to monitor unlisted federal 
license and permit activities, and may inform the federal agency 
and applicant that they seek consistency certification of a 
particular activity within 30 days of notice of the activity; if 
the request is untimely "the State agency waives its right to 
review the unlisted activity."  Id. § 930.54(a).  The Assistant 
Administrator of NOAA must approve the request for consistency 
review of an unlisted license application.  Id. § 930.54(c).   
                                                                  
enforceable policies of approved State 
management programs. 
Id. § 1456(c)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1992). 
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 An applicant for a license selected for consistency 
review must submit to the federal agency and the state a 
certification that the proposed activity is consistent with the 
state's coastal zone management program, along with certain 
required information.  Id. §§ 930.57, 930.58.  The regulations 
provide for state agency review of consistency certifications, 
and means to resolve state objections to such certifications. Id. 
§§ 930.59-930.66.  Licenses may not issue until CZMA requirements 
are satisfied.  Id. § 930.53(e). 
 B.  The Coast Guard Action 
 NJDEPE contends LIPA's submission of its Operations 
Plan constituted an application for a required federal license or 
permit, thereby triggering the CZMA's consistency review 
requirements, and the Coast Guard improperly granted a license or 
permit before those requirements were met.  The Coast Guard 
approval does not fall within a category of license listed in New 
Jersey's coastal zone management program as requiring consistency 
review.  Furthermore, as we discussed in addressing the NEPA 
claims, we agree with the district court that no required federal 
license or permit was applied for or granted, nor should there 
have been.  Therefore, consistency review was not called for. 
 None of the licenses listed for consistency review in 
New Jersey's approved "Coastal Management Program" relates to the 
Coast Guard action in this case.  J.A. at 290; 7 N.J.A.C. § 7E. 
NJDEPE cites its Federal Consistency in New Jersey's Coastal 
Management Program -- A Handbook (Jan. 1991), which lists 
licenses for which applicants "should consult with [NJDEPE's 
41 
Division of Coastal Resources] regarding [their] consistency 
status."  J.A. at 281.  This list includes "[p]ermits and 
authorization for the handling of dangerous cargo by vessels in 
U.S. ports" issued pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 170.  Id. at 282.  But 
even if such a permit was issued (we note that none is mentioned 
in the letter, and that no New Jersey port was involved in the 
journey), the Handbook does not represent an amendment to the 
approved coastal program, because it was not approved by NOAA 
after consultation with the affected agency, as the regulations 
require.0  15 C.F.R. § 930.53(d).  Thus, such permits are not 
officially listed for consistency certification. 
 Because the Coast Guard did not issue a license listed 
in New Jersey's Coastal Management Program, the Coast Guard 
action could only be submitted to consistency review as an 
"unlisted Federal license and permit activit[y]" under 15 C.F.R. 
§ 930.54(a), which requires the state agency to inform the 
federal agency of the requested review within 30 days of the 
state's notice of the application for such license or permit.  
NJDEPE requested consistency certification in letters to the 
Coast Guard dated September 8, 1993, and to NOAA, dated September 
15 and 28.   
 We need not inquire into the timeliness of NJDEPE's 
request for consistency review of the Coast Guard action because 
we have found the Coast Guard did not issue "a required Federal 
                     
0The handbook states on its cover, "These guidelines supplement, 
but are not part of the New Jersey Coastal Management Program, 
September 1980."  J.A. at 271. 
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license or permit."0  The voluntary submission of an Operations 
Plan for review by the Coast Guard does not make LIPA an 
"applicant for a required Federal license or permit" under 16 
U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A).  LIPA sought review of its Operations 
Plan for general compliance with law and regulation, and also 
gave information to the Coast Guard for coordination and safety 
purposes.  The use of the term "approval" in the letter from the 
Captain of the Port does not create a license or permit 
requirement for this kind of shipping.0 
 NJDEPE points out that the Coast Guard had 
discretionary enforcement powers which they did not exercise with 
respect to the LIPA shipment.  These powers are relevant here 
only to show the nature of the Coast Guard's approval of the 
Operations Plan -- the Coast Guard saw no violations of law or 
                     
0Although we reach our decision independently, we note that NOAA 
came to the same conclusion.  In rejecting NJDEPE's request for 
consistency review, NOAA concluded: 
LIPA has not applied for a Federal license or 
permit, and moreover, the Coast Guard has not 
proposed any activities concerning the 
shipment.  LIPA was not legally required to 
present the Coast Guard with its operation 
plan for review, but elected to do so on a 
voluntary basis. 
Letter from Frank Maloney, NOAA, to Jeanne K. Fox, NJDEPE (Oct. 
1, 1993) J.A. 230-31. 
 
0Section 930.51(a) of 15 C.F.R. defines "Federal license or 
permit" as "any authorization, certification, approval, or other 
form of permission which any Federal agency is empowered to issue 
to an applicant."  (Emphasis added.)  Arguably, the Coast Guard 
response to LIPA's Operations Plan could qualify as such an 
approval, although we would hesitate to apply the term to a mere 
refusal to exercise discretionary enforcement powers.  We need 
not decide whether the definition applies here, however, for even 
if the Coast Guard did issue such an approval, the approval was 
not required before shipment. 
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regulation in the plan, and found no need to exercise its 
discretionary powers.  The Coast Guard did not, for example, 
exercise its powers under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1221-32 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992), particularly the 
power of the Secretary of Transportation (delegated to the Coast 
Guard under 49 C.F.R. § 1.46) to order a vessel "to operate or 
anchor in a manner he directs" if he believes the vessel does not 
comply with applicable regulation, law or treaty, or for other 
safety reasons, 33 U.S.C. § 1223(b).  Furthermore, the Coast 
Guard did not respond to the Operations Plan by exercising 
discretionary powers to supervise and control movement of vessels 
for protection of the vessel, waterfront facilities, or U.S. 
waters, 33 C.F.R. § 6.04-8, to require the securing of permits 
for handling, storage, loading and unloading dangerous cargo, id. 
§ 6.12-3, or to supervise the handling, etc. of dangerous cargo, 
id. § 126.29.  A list of discretionary powers, however, may not 
convert the Coast Guard's non-action into a grant of a required 
license or permit.  
 Because no required federal license or permit was 
involved in the exchange between LIPA and the Coast Guard, the 
Coast Guard did not violate the CZMA by not requiring a 
consistency certification from LIPA. 
 C. Claims against PECo and LIPA 
 NJDEPE also complains PECo and LIPA violated the CZMA 
by receiving federal licenses without submitting consistency 
certifications.  These claims suffer from a defect which the CZMA 
claims against the federal agencies did not.  While federal 
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statutes allow injured parties to sue for judicial review of 
federal agency action, see, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06, CZMA claims 
against private parties must be grounded in a right of action 
found in the CZMA itself.  Because we find the CZMA creates no 
such right of action, these claims must fail.0 
 Where a statute does not explicitly create a right of 
action for a particular party, a court may find such a right 
implied only where it can confidently conclude Congress so 
intended.  Otherwise, "[i]mplication of private rights of action 
may `alter the remedial scheme devised by Congress for the 
enforcement of statutory programs and . . . place the judiciary 
in the role of enunciating or modifying policy decisions properly 
the preserve of the legislature.'"  American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. v. M/V Cape Fear, 967 F.2d 864, 866 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(quoting United States v. FMC Corp., 717 F.2d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 
1983)) (AT&T).  In determining "the ultimate issue [of] whether 
Congress intended to create a private right of action," 
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981), we follow 
the four-part test set out by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash: 
First, is the plaintiff `one of the class for 
whose especial benefit the statute was 
enacted,' -- that is, does the statute create 
a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? 
Second, is there any indication of 
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, 
either to create such a remedy or to deny 
one?  Third, is it consistent with the 
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme 
                     
0We find only one published opinion on this question, New York v. 
DeLyser, 759 F. Supp. 982 (W.D.N.Y. 1991), which concludes the 
CZMA does not imply a state right of action against private 
parties. 
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to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? 
[Fourth,] is the cause of action one 
traditionally relegated to state law, in an 
area basically the concern of the States, so 
that it would be inappropriate to infer a 
cause of action based solely on federal law? 
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citations omitted).0 
The Court has indicated that the first two criteria are of 
primary importance, and "[i]f they do not point toward a private 
right, the remaining two `cannot by themselves be a basis for 
implying a right of action.'  By the same token, if the statute 
and legislative history reveal congressional intent to create a 
right of action, `there is no need . . . to "trudge through all 
four of the factors."'"  AT&T, 967 F.2d at 866-67 (citations 
omitted) (alteration in original).  
 1.  Is NJDEPE an especial 
beneficiary of the statute? 
 We first inquire as to whether NJDEPE is "`one of the 
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,' --that 
is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of" NJDEPE?  
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (citation omitted).   The Supreme Court has 
explained that "benefit to certain parties is, by itself, 
                     
0This test applies to states as well as private parties seeking 
implied rights of action.  In FMC Corp, we applied Cort to a 
claim by the federal government that it had a right of action 
under a federal patent law.  We stated, "Separation-of-powers 
concerns apply with equal weight whether the enforcing party is a 
private litigant or the United States.  In either case, the 
central problem is the same:  did Congress intend to authorize a 
right of action about which the statute is silent?" FMC Corp., 
717 F.2d at 780.  That logic has equal force here --it is 
Congress which must determine whether any particular party, be it 
state, federal government, or private person, has a right of 
action under a federal statute. 
46 
irrelevant:  `[t]he question is not simply who would benefit from 
the Act, but whether Congress intended to confer federal rights 
upon those beneficiaries.'"  FMC Corp., 717 F.2d at 781 (quoting 
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294).  We look to the 
statute itself for language explicitly conferring a right on the 
plaintiff's class for indication Congress intended the plaintiff 
to have a right of action.  If we find the statute merely 
"imposes a duty without an `unmistakable focus' on the benefitted 
class, [we] are reluctant to infer a remedy."  AT&T, 967 F.2d at 
867 (quoting FMC, 717 F.2d at 781). 
 As in California v. Sierra Club and FMC, we have a 
statute which benefits the enforcing party, NJDEPE, but does not 
confer federal rights that NJDEPE may assert against the private 
defendants.  In the CZMA, Congress alluded to "a national 
interest in the effective management, beneficial use, protection, 
and development of the coastal zone," 16 U.S.C. § 1451(a), and 
found the key to promoting that interest to be "to encourage the 
states to exercise their full authority over the lands and waters 
in the coastal zone," id. § 1451(i).  The CZMA therefore provides 
for federal assistance in states' development of coastal zone 
management plans, and coordinates federal activities with the 
state management program.  The states may benefit through 
enhanced authority and healthier coastal zones, but this is to 
serve the ultimate goal of protecting the nation's coastal zones. 
This benefit does not translate into "a right in favor" of the 
state that it can enforce against PECo and LIPa. 
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 In the "Coordination and cooperation" provision at 
issue, 16 U.S.C. § 1456, the absence of rights-conferring 
language is marked.  Duties are placed on applicants for federal 
licenses:  the provision requires "any applicant for a required 
Federal license or permit to conduct an activity" affecting a 
state's coastal zone to submit a consistency certification to the 
federal agency, and to give a copy to the state.  Id. 
§1456(c)(3)(A).  Duties are also placed on federal agencies: 
No license or permit shall be granted by the 
Federal agency until the state or its 
designated agency has concurred with the 
applicant's certification or until, by the 
state's failure to act, the concurrence is 
conclusively presumed, unless the Secretary 
[of Commerce], on his own initiative or upon 
appeal by the applicant, finds, after 
providing a reasonable opportunity for 
detailed comments from the Federal agency 
involved and from the state, that the 
activity is consistent with the objectives of 
this chapter or is otherwise necessary in the 
interest of national security. 
Id.  These duties are not articulated in terms of rights of the 
state,0 and there is no indication elsewhere of any right of the 
state to enforce the duties.  Indeed, the federal government 
maintains control of the process from beginning to end:  the 
Secretary of Commerce must approve the state's coastal zone 
                     
0As we have previously noted, Cort cited Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), as an example of 
an implied right of action found to be based on a clear 
articulation of a federal right in favor of the plaintiff. The 
Bivens right was based on the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees 
the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."  
U.S. Const. amendment IV (emphasis added).  See Cort, 422 U.S. at 
82; AT&T, 967 F.2d at 870.  The language of the CZMA makes no 
such mention of rights. 
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management program, which is the basis of consistency review, id. 
§ 1455(d), and decides whether an application may be granted 
despite a state's claim that it is not consistent with the 
management program, id. § 1456(c)(3)(A).  The language of this 
statute thus "focuses on the class of persons on whom a duty is 
imposed . . . and not on a class of intended beneficiaries," and 
does not establish the state as the especial beneficiary.  FMC 
Corp., 717 F.2d at 783. 
 Where a statute provides neither an explicit right of 
action for a particular party, nor clearly articulates a federal 
right in that party, a right of action may only be implied where 
there is a "`pervasive legislative scheme governing the 
relationship between the plaintiff class and the defendant class 
in a particular regard.'"  AT&T, 967 F.2d at 870 (quoting Cort, 
422 U.S. at 82).  The CZMA is not such a scheme.  While it 
certainly affects the relationship between the state and private 
parties applying for federal licenses, much of that relationship 
is determined by other state and federal law.  Furthermore, if 
the CZMA is a "pervasive legislative scheme" at all, it is one 
governing the relationship between state and federal authorities 
with regard to coastal management. 
 2.  Was there legislative 
intent to create the requested 
remedy? 
 Having found the language of the CZMA does not make the 
states especial beneficiaries for purposes of implied rights of 
action, we next look for "any indication of legislative intent, 
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explicit or implicit, either to create [the requested] remedy or 
to deny [it]."  Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.  The legislative history 
accords with the language of the statute, indicating no intent to 
create this right of action. 
 NJDEPE cites to one statement from a Senate report  
that shows the states were seen as integral to the coastal 
management scheme being established in the CZMA: 
[The CZMA] has as its main purpose the 
encouragement and assistance of States in 
preparing and implementing management 
programs to preserve, protect, develop and 
whenever possible restore the resources of 
the coastal zone of the United States. . . . 
There is no attempt to diminish state 
authority through federal preemption.  The 
intent of this legislation is to enhance 
state authority by encouraging and assisting 
the states to assume planning and regulatory 
powers over their Coastal zones. 
 
S. Rep. No. 753, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776.  Federal support to the states serves the 
overarching purpose of the statute, which is to promote better 
management of the nation's coast:  "The [Commerce] Committee has 
adopted the States as the focal point for developing 
comprehensive plans and implementation management programs for 
the coastal zone."  Id. at 4780.  But, these statements of 
purposes and goals do not represent an open-ended grant of 
enforcement authority to the states.  Rather, the statute 
"assist[s] and encourage[s]" the states through explicit 
measures, such as grants for development and administration of 
coastal management programs, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-55, and the 
consistency certification process, id. § 1456.  A general 
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statement of intent to enhance state authority, given effect 
through explicit measures in the statute itself, cannot be taken 
to indicate an intent also to create rights of actions that the 
statute fails to mention.  It may be fairly said that "the 
legislative history . . . is entirely silent on the question 
whether a [state] right of action [against private parties] 
should or should not be available."  Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979).  Where, as we have found, 
"the plain language of the provision weighs against implication 
of [the requested] remedy, the fact that there is no suggestion 
whatsoever in the legislative history that [§ 1456] may give rise 
to suits [against private applicants for federal licenses] 
reinforces our decision not to find such a right of action 
implicit within the section."  Id. 
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  3.  Conclusion 
 Because we find the states are not especial 
beneficiaries of the CZMA by its language, and no indication of 
legislative intent to create a cause of action in favor of states 
against private parties, we need not "trudge through" the 
remaining two Cort factors.  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 388 (1982)).  "The question 
whether Congress, either expressly or by implication, intended to 
create a [state] right of action [against private parties], has 
been definitively answered in the negative."  Touche Ross & Co., 
442 U.S. at 576.  NJDEPE's complaint against LIPA and PECo under 
the CZMA must therefore be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim. 
V. 
 NJDEPE's motion for injunctive relief was properly 
denied by the district court.  A movant for preliminary 
injunction must show: 
that irreparable injury will occur if relief is not 
granted to maintain the status quo until a final 
adjudication on the merits can be made and that there 
is a reasonable probability of eventual success on the 
merits.  In addition, the court must weigh the 
possibility of harm to the nonmoving party as well as 
to any other interested persons and, when relevant, 
harm to the public. 
Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 356-
57 (3d Cir. 1980).  Because we find that NJDEPE must fail on the 
merits of its case, no injunction can issue. 
 As we have discussed, NJDEPE had several avenues to 
present its claims other than as a request for an injunction.  It 
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could have petitioned for rescission of the NRC regulation it 
objected to, 10 C.F.R. § 2.802(a), for an exception to the 
application of that rule here, id. § 2.758(b), or for a 
modification or suspension of PECo's license that allowed 
transportation of the fuel, id. § 2.206.  Some of these options 
are still viable.   
VI. 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the district 
court's dismissal of NJDEPE's claim against the NRC under NEPA, 
and its grant of summary judgment to the Coast Guard on the CZMA 
claim.  We will also instruct the district court to dismiss 
NJDEPE's claim against the NRC, PECo, and LIPA under the CZMA. 
